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ABSTRACT 
 
In this article, we introduce an index of ex ante exchange market pressure (EMP) that 
can be used as a benchmark against which to measure the effectiveness of sterilized 
intervention. Ex ante EMP is the change in the exchange rate that would have been 
observed if the policy authority had refrained from intervening and this policy decision 
had been correctly anticipated by rational agents. Ex post EMP measures the exchange 
market pressure under the policy actually implemented. We use a ratio of these two 
EMP measures to assess the effectiveness of sterilized intervention in Canada and 
Australia and find that its effects persist even in quarterly data.  
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1. Introduction  
 
After the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, and the brief experiment 
with floating exchange rates that followed it, most countries adopted some form of 
intermediate exchange rate system. The hallmark of these intermediate systems of 
exchange rate management is the use of sterilized intervention, in which the policy 
authority seeks to neutralize the impact of its foreign exchange market transactions on 
the domestic money supply through the purchase or sale of domestic assets.  
Although the term “exchange market intervention” may be applied to any 
policy action that is undertaken with the objective of influencing the rate of exchange 
between two sovereign currencies, it is more commonly used to refer to the official 
purchase or sale of foreign currency by the policy authority charged with safeguarding 
the international value of the domestic currency. There is general agreement that 
official foreign exchange transactions that are not sterilized are an effective means of 
exchange rate management. The same cannot be said of sterilized intervention. 
Although the results obtained in recent studies are somewhat more encouraging that 
those obtained in the past, the impact of sterilized intervention on exchange rates 
remains controversial.
1 In this article, we develop a new approach to assessing the 
impact of sterilized intervention on exchange rates. Specifically, we derive and 
estimate indices of exchange market pressure that provide a quantitative measure of the 
quarter-by-quarter effectiveness of exchange market intervention.  
Empirical studies of sterilized intervention have focused primarily on 
determining the degree to which the signaling and portfolio balance channels, that 
theory suggests are the principal means by which sterilized intervention can influence 
exchange rates, represent empirically significant channels of transmission.
2 Until 
recently, many central banks were not inclined to make their intervention data available 
to external researchers.
3  Earlier studies therefore used changes in official foreign 
exchange reserves as a measure of intervention activity. The fact that reserves data are a 
                                                 
1Edison (1993) provides a comprehensive survey of the literature from 1982 to 1993. A 
survey of more recent contributions may be found in Sarno and Taylor (2001). 
2Recently, Sarno and Taylor (2001) have suggested that the role played by sterilized 
intervention in remedying coordination failures in the foreign exchange market may 
represent a third channel of influence that merits closer study. 
3 Although many central banks still prefer not to give out their intervention data, a 
growing number of central banks in industrial countries are now making their 
intervention data public, though with a considerable lag.   2
very noisy proxy for intervention partly explains the lack of consensus among the 
earlier empirical studies.  
The release of US daily intervention data in the early 1990s led to renewed 
interest in the study of sterilized intervention. Using US intervention data, Dominguez 
and Frankel (1993a) found support for the functioning of both a signaling and a 
portfolio balance channel in the 1980s at weekly and bi-weekly frequencies. 
Dominguez and Frankel (1993b) also found that publicly announced interventions have 
a significantly greater impact on the exchange rate than do secret interventions. 
Evidence of the operation of a signaling channel has also been provided by Lewis 
(1995), Kaminsky and Lewis (1996), and Bonser-Neal, Roley, and Sellon (1998), 
among others. Dominguez and Frankel’s (1993b) conclusion regarding the importance 
of announcements has been challenged by Peiers (1997) and Chang and Taylor (1998). 
Both of these studies employ intra-day data and find that the market learns about 
official interventions through the foreign exchange trading associated with them, rather 
than through public announcements. Overall, the evidence provided by all of the more 
recent studies indicates that, at the very least, sterilized interventions can influence 
exchange rates in the short term.  
Most of the empirical studies dealing with sterilized intervention use direction 
of causality to establish the impact of intervention on the exchange rate. Because of the 
speed with which the foreign exchange market responds to changing conditions, 
causality between intervention and observed exchange rate movements can necessarily 
only be detected at fairly high frequencies. While the results obtained using high 
frequency data are useful for determining the nature of the channel of transmission 
between sterilized intervention and exchange rate movements, they provide little 
information about the usefulness of sterilized intervention as a policy tool. It is not 
enough to show that sterilized intervention is capable of generating a temporary change 
in the exchange rate; in order to be useful as a policy tool, sterilized intervention must 
bring about persistent changes in the foreign exchange market.  
The speed of transmission in the foreign exchange market ensures that tests of 
causal direction will fail at quarterly frequencies. In order to identify the longer term 
impact of a particular intervention, it is necessary to find some way of determining what 
the exchange market conditions would have been in the absence of that policy initiative. 
This entails using available observed data to construct a counterfactual measure of ex 
ante exchange market conditions. To the best of our knowledge, only two studies have   3
employed counterfactuals to assess the impact of intervention. The first of these is by 
Blundell-Wignall and Masson (1985), who simulated a small macroeconomic model 
under the counter-factual assumption of no intervention, and then compared the results 
of their simulation to observed outcomes generated by the policy actually implemented. 
The second study, by Bonser-Neal and Tanner (1996), focuses on the impact of 
intervention on ex ante exchange rate volatility. They use the volatilities of currency 
auction prices as a measure of ex ante exchange rate volatility.  
Our objective, in this article, is to determine whether the impact of sterilized 
intervention on the foreign exchange market is persistent enough to be discernible in 
quarterly data. We conclude that this is indeed the case. Typically, the extant literature 
has assessed the effectiveness of sterilized intervention ex post. Instead, we propose a 
measure of ex ante market pressure that, when combined with an indicator of ex post 
pressure, enables us to obtain a quantitative representation of the impact of intervention 
on exchange market conditions. Ex ante exchange market pressure, by contrast, 
measures the international excess demand for a currency that would have been 
observed in the absence of intervention. Our index of ex ante exchange market pressure 
therefore describes the environment that the policy authority faced and to which it 
responded in a given period. The concept of ex post exchange market pressure, 
introduced by Weymark (1995, 1998), measures the international excess demand for a 
currency under the intervention policy actually implemented. The impact of sterilized 
intervention can then be measured in index form as the proportion of ex ante exchange 
market pressure removed by intervention. We refer to this index as the PICE (Policy 
Induced Change in Exchange market conditions) index.
4  
Since the ex ante measure of exchange market pressure is not directly observed 
it must, therefore, be imputed from a theoretical model. In order to obtain estimates of 
exchange market pressure, we apply the two-step methodology introduced by 
Weymark (1995, 1998) to a theoretical model. This means, in the first instance, 
proposing a model-independent definition of each index. Next, the definitions are 
applied to a theoretical model from which we derive model-consistent index formulae. 
These provide the functional relationship between exchange market pressure and 
                                                 
4 To the extent that the difference between ex ante and ex post measures of exchange 
market pressure reflects unanticipated events and, hence, acts like news our finding 
sterilized intervention has persistent exchange rate effects is consistent with the 
findings of Engel and West (2005).   4
economic variables that are directly observable. We then estimate our model and use 
the estimation results to calculate our quarterly indices of ex ante and ex post exchange 
market pressure.  
We illustrate our approach by applying it to Canadian and Australian data. 
Although the methodology we have developed can be applied to any open economy, 
Canada and Australia have specific attributes that make them ideal subjects for our 
study. First, they are both economies whose central banks, during the decade or so prior 
to the adoption of inflation targeting, regularly intervened in the foreign exchange 
market. Nevertheless, the two central banks had quite different aims in pursuing their 
intervention policies. As shown below, these differences show up clearly in our index 
of the impact of sterilized interventions. Second, both economies can properly be 
modeled as small open economies and this simplifies the algebraic derivation of our 
counter-factual exchange market pressure measures.  
Our findings indicate that the impact of intervention undertaken by both the 
Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) and the Bank of Canada (BoC) on the value of their 
currencies relative to the US dollar. We also conclude that the RBA intervened 
relatively more heavily than the BoC. However, reversals in the direction of change in 
the exchange rate are relatively more frequent for Canada, and especially so once 
inflation targeting was put into place. Our methodology is unable to ascertain the costs 
of intervention or the effects of intervention at higher moments (e.g., exchange rate 
volatility). Hence, we cannot comment on the advisability of sterilized interventions.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides 
definitions for ex ante and ex post exchange market pressure. Section 3 considers the 
implementation of our modeling strategy for Canada while section 4 considers the 
Australian case. Section 5 evaluates the effectiveness of sterilized interventions 
undertaken by the BoC and the RBA. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Exchange Market Pressure: Model-Independent Definitions  
In order to measure the impact of exchange market intervention on the total 
excess demand for a currency, we construct two indices of exchange market pressure 
(EMP): ex ante EMP and ex post EMP indices. Ex ante EMP measures the international 
excess demand for a currency that would have arisen if the policy authority had not 
intervened in the exchange market in a particular time period. Ex post EMP measures 
the total excess demand for a given currency that is associated with the policy actually 
implemented in a particular time period. The difference between ex ante and ex post   5
EMP indices provides a quantitative measure of the effectiveness of the intervention 
undertaken by the policy authority. The formal definitions of ex ante and ex post EMP 
follow.  
2.1 Ex Ante Exchange Market Pressure  
Definition: Ex ante EMP is measured as the change in the exchange rate that would 
have occurred if the policy authority had refrained from exchange market intervention 
in a given period, under the assumption that this policy decision was correctly 
anticipated by economic agents.  
2.2 Ex Post Exchange Market Pressure  
Definition: Ex post EMP is measured as the change in the exchange rate that would 
have occurred if the policy authority had unexpectedly refrained from intervening in 
the foreign exchange market, given the expectations generated by the exchange rate 
policy actually implemented.
5  
The EMP indices described above are not directly observable and must be 
imputed on the basis of an appropriately specified structural model. The structural 
model that we will use to derive model-consistent, operational indices of ex ante and ex 
post EMP for Canada are described in the following sections.  
3. Canada: Model Specification and Exchange Market Pressure Indices 
In the 1980s, the BoC frequently intervened in the foreign exchange market, 
ostensibly to reduce exchange rate volatility, or to prevent excessive fluctuations in the 
exchange rate.
6 The accumulated evidence to date tends to cast doubts about whether 
this policy was effective.
7  
In recent years, countries that have adopted inflation targeting have chosen to 
forego exchange intervention, in order to avoid the possibility of conflict between 
exchange rate and inflation targets. The BoC announced in September 1998 that foreign 
exchange intervention would henceforth be publicly announced.
 8 Since that time, the 
                                                 
5A detailed discussion of the theoretical foundations and the measurement of ex post 
exchange market pressure may be found in Weymark (1995, 1998). That work focused 
only on measuring ex post EMP, and the resulting index was simply “exchange market 
pressure.” 
6See Murray, Zelmer, and McManus (1997) for an analysis of this period. 
7See, for example, Rogers and Siklos (2003) and Fatum and King (2005). Chiu (2003) 
describes the Bank of Canada’s foreign exchange intervention activities over time. 
8There was one coordinated intervention with the ECB, the Fed, and the Bank of 
England in September 2000.   6
Bank has intervened only once, as part of a coordinated intervention.
9 It is not entirely 
clear whether the announcement refers to any form of intervention, or the non-sterilized 
variety only. After all, even if the central bank does not formally intervene in the 
foreign exchange markets, it may, at the behest of the government, which usually 
retains ownership of the reserves, engage in the purchase and sale of foreign exchange 
for reasons of portfolio balance. In addition, trading partners may continue to intervene, 
requiring possibly a domestic portfolio balance adjustment. Finally, a credible signal of 
non-intervention can also influence expectations of the exchange rate, and, 
consequently, affect exchange market pressure.  
3.1 A Simple Empirical Model  
The quarterly model specified below was chosen with the Canadian economy in 
mind. Hence, it is a model of a small open economy in which foreign prices and interest 
rates are exogenous. Our model is rich enough to allow us to explicitly incorporate 
varying degrees of intervention, sterilization, and asset substitutability. At the same 
time, our model is also simple enough to yield tractable exchange market pressure 
formulae. The particular lag structure reflects the outcome of the estimation phase of 
our procedure and is described below.  Our specification choices were driven by two 
concerns: (1) the need to obtain model estimates with reasonable empirical properties 
(i.e., estimates that are broadly in agreement with those obtained for small open 
economy models elsewhere in the literature), and (2) the need to have a model that is 
tractable enough to allow us to solve for the expectations variables in the model under 
the assumption that agents are fully rational. The equations therefore reflect a 
compromise between the degree of complexity that would be considered idea; for 
estimation purposes, and the degree of simplicity desired for reasons of analytical 
tractability. Formally, we characterize the Canadian economy as follows.  
  01 12 33 14 E[ ] tt t t t t t t t yq π αα π απ α α π π ε
∗
−+ − =+ + + + − Δ − +                   (1) 
 
  01 12 2 3 3 [] [ ] tt t t t t t t yy i q β ββπ β π π η
∗
−− − =+ − − − − Δ − +                         (2) 
 
  1 E tt t t t t ic i q d μ σ
∗
+ =++Δ + Δ+                                                                     (3) 
                                                 
9The BIS (2005) refers to the purchase or sale of foreign currency by a central bank as a 
“narrow” form of intervention. Many emerging markets prefer to use a broader 
definition of intervention, which includes any purchase or sale of foreign currency   7
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  tt t rq ρ Δ= −Δ.                                                                                                        (9) 
 
Equations (1) and (2) describe the determinants of the Canadian inflation rate, 
t π  and the output gap t y . According to (1) the inflation rate in period t depends on the 
rate of inflation and the output gap in  1 t − , the percentage change in the real exchange 
rate in period t , given by [] tt t q π π
∗ +Δ − , the three-period-ahead expectation of 
inflation E 3 t π + , and the shock  t ε . The variables  t π
∗ and  t q  denote the US inflation rate 
and the log of the nominal CAD/USD exchange rate, respectively. In common with 
several papers in the Phillips curve literature, inflation is determined by forward and 
backward-looking elements.
10 The Canadian output gap in period t depends on the 
magnitude of the gap in 1 t − , the lagged domestic interest rate, 2 t i − , the lagged domestic 
inflation rate  3 t π − , and the percentage change in the real exchange rate. The one period 
lag between  2 t i −  and  3 t π −  reflects the fact that agents would not have had data for  2 t π −  
when estimating the real interest rate. 
In (3) we modify the usual uncovered interest parity (UIP) condition to allow 
for the possibility that US and Canadian financial instruments may not be perfect 
substitutes. The term  t d μΔ , represents a risk premium that the market may impose 
                                                                                                                                            
regardless of whether or not the central bank is an active participant. 
10 Kichian (2001) is a recent paper that estimates comparable Phillips curves for 
Canada.   8
when there is an increase in the relative availability of Canadian financial instruments. 
The variables  t i
∗ and  t d  represent the US interest rate and the log of domestic credit 
component of the Canadian money supply, respectively.
11 It is well-known that UIP 
fails to hold empirically. Lothian and Wu (2005) argue that this finding is due to the 
uniqueness of the 1980s, combined with noisy departures from UIP. By using the risk 
premium  t d μΔ to modify the UIP condition, we allow for deviations from UIP in a way 
that proves to be statistically significant.  
Equation (4) is a parsimonious empirical money demand equation that is 
derived upon a simple error-correction specification of Canadian money demand. The 
variable  t m  denotes the log of the Canadian money supply and  t χ  is an exogenous 
money demand disturbance. All other variables are as previously defined.
12  
Equations (5)–(9) describe the determinants of the Canadian money supply. In 
(5), the changes in the money supply  t m Δ   are identified as originating from two 
sources,  changes in domestic credit  t d Δ  or changes in foreign exchange reserves  t r Δ , 
with  t m ,  t d , and  t r  measured in logarithms. According to (6)–(8), changes in domestic 
credit occur either as a policy response to observed inflation or output gap levels as 
described in (7), or in the course of sterilizing foreign exchange market intervention as 
described in (8).  
The policy authority’s intervention policy is characterized by (9). Changes in 
foreign exchange reserves are described as occurring as a result of the policy 
authority’s response to contemporaneous exchange rate changes. The time-varying 
intervention parameter  t ρ  characterizes the degree of exchange market intervention in 
each period. A value of  0 t ρ =   indicates that the policy authority refrained from 
intervention and allowed the exchange rate to float freely at timet. The decision to hold 
the exchange rate fixed at timet, on the other hand, is characterized by  t ρ =∞. Values 
                                                 
11Increases in  t d , raise the reserves of the Canadian banking system. This prompts 
banks to expand their holdings of high quality private and government bonds, reducing 
the relative availability of such bonds for private portfolios. Where substitutability 
between US and Canadian assets is not perfect, the relative scarcity of high quality 
private and government bonds would result in a reduction in the risk premium on 
Canadian bonds. Thus  t i  and  t d Δ  would be negatively related in (3). 
12 The Appendix to the paper provides the actual estimates of the vector error correction 
model upon which (4) is based.   9
of  t ρ   between 0 and ∞   are characteristic of intermediate exchange rate systems. 
Negative values of  t ρ  occur when intervention by the policy authority causes and 
exchange rate change of greater absolute magnitude than, or of opposite sign to, the 
change that would have occurred in the absence of intervention. 
In the 1980s central banks switched from using a monetary aggregate to using a 
short-term interest rate as an intermediate target for monetary policy. It has therefore 
become accepted practice to characterize the determinants of systematic monetary 
policy in terms of an interest rate response function. However, our focus in this article 
is in the intervention and sterilization activities, both of which affect the components of 
the monetary base directly, and affect interest rates only indirectly. For this reason, the 
central bank’s response to changes in inflation and economic activity is represented in 
(4), in terms of changes in the short-term interest rate. Note, however, that (4)-(9) imply 
an interest rate response of the form: 
011 1 1
11 1 1
ˆ ˆˆ tt t y y t t t t
ty tt t t y t t t




γπ γ ρ λ
γπ γ ρ λ γπ γ ρ λ
++ + +
− −−−
=+ + + Δ
+++ Δ + + +Δ  
     (10) 
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45 3 43 4 3
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γγ γγ λ λ γ γ γ γ λ λ
γγ γγ λ λ
= = = = − + =− =−
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  Equation (10) clearly resembles an open economy Taylor rule with both 
forward and backward-looking elements.    
3.2 Model Estimates  
In order to compute the values of the exchange market pressure indices defined 
in Section 2, our model must be estimated. In particular, we require estimates of the 
parameters in (1)–(4), (7), as well as the degree of intervention λ  in (8). We chose to 
estimate the equations separately using either OLS or GMM, depending upon whether 
the specification is backward or forward-looking. In every case we chose the most 
parsimonious specification that satisfied appropriate diagnostic test criteria as well as 
the test of parameter plausibility. Our estimation results and data sources are relegated 
to Appendix 1. The sample covers the period 1978-2004. 
In estimating the forward-looking Phillips curve (1), inflation, measured as the 
annual rate of change in the CPI, was regressed on the lagged output gap, lagged 
inflation, the three-quarters-ahead inflation rate, and the rate of change in the real   10
exchange rate. The output gap was obtained using an HP filter with a standard 
smoothing parameter of 1600.
13 The real exchange rate variable is evaluated in terms of 
relative consumer prices. Estimates reveal that the Canadian Phillips curve has 
significant forward and backward-looking elements, as well as exhibiting considerable 
inflation persistence. These results are in accord with estimates obtained in other 
studies.
14  
Because of the current interest in New Keynesian specifications, our quarterly 
IS curve for Canada initially contained forward-looking output gap and inflation 
elements. However, we were unable to specify a forward-looking IS curve that yielded 
plausible parameters. This problem, which has been encountered in the empirical 
literature more generally, led us to instead adopt a backward-looking specification. In 
the specification we employ, the lagged real interest rate is significant and negative, as 
theory predicts, and there is a high degree of persistence in the output gap.  
Prior to April 1995, the BoC intervened to influence exchange rate movements 
outside an unobserved non-intervention band. Thereafter, the BoC reduced the 
frequency of interventions, but increased the intensity when it did intervene. In 
September 1998, the BoC abandoned its mechanistic approach to intervention 
altogether, engaging only in a G-7 coordinated intervention to support the euro on 
September 22, 2000. In view of the changes in Canadian intervention policy that took 
place over the sample period, we estimated several versions of an equation describing 
international trade in assets. The variable  t d Δ  is proxied by the log difference (or 
annual rates) in  t d , which is measured as the difference between Gross M1 and official 
foreign exchange reserves. When (3) is estimated without taking into account the 
change in intervention policy, the coefficient μ   is negative, as expected, but 
statistically insignificant. However, if the change in reserves is set to zero after 1998Q2, 
given that the BoC has not officially intervened since that time, then the dummy 
variable is negative and statistically significant. Hence the combined coefficients are 
negative and statistically significant, as confirmed by a Wald test.  
The fourth set of parameter estimates belong to the Canadian money demand 
                                                 
13Estimation of similar specifications using the BoC’s own output gap estimates 
yielded very similar outcomes as those obtained using the HP filtered output gap. This 
is not an entirely surprising result given that an important element in the Bank’s 
estimates is reliance on an HP filter. See Rennison (2003). 
14See, for example, Guay, Luger, and Zhu (2002).   11
equation (4). Following Adam and Hendry (1999), we estimated a vector error 
correction model (VECM) using the (Gross) M1 measure of the money supply. Like 
Adam and Hendry, we conclude that M1, CPI, real GDP, and a short-term interest rate 
are cointegrated. All long-term elasticities, with the exception of the one for real 
income, are statistically significant. Overall, our estimates are not dissimilar to those 
reported by Adam and Hendry.  
In order to estimate π γ ,  y γ , and λ , we combined (6)–(8) to obtain the equation  
  tt y t t dm y r π γ πγ λ Δ=+ + − Δ .                                                                          (11) 
 
In the theoretical model,  t r Δ  represents the changes in reserves that occur as a result of 
the central bank’s intervention activities. However, reserve changes are, in practice, 
often a noisy proxy for official intervention. Although actual intervention data is 
generally thought to be superior to reserve data for use in studies of intervention 
activity, Canadian intervention data contains a rather puzzling omission.  In particular, 
although an announcement of the BoC’s participation in the coordinated G-7 
intervention of September 22, 2000 was made on the BoC’s web site, the actual 
intervention data provided to us by the Bank of Canada records that no intervention 
took place on that day.
15 We therefore estimated (11) twice, once using intervention 
data and a second time using official reserves data.
16 Because of the omission from 
September 2000, as well as due to the fact that central banks intervene in foreign 
exchange markets not only via the purchase or sale of foreign exchange but through 
derivatives, via standing arrangements with other central banks, as well as on behalf of 
the Government, the results below rely on reserves data. 
Except for the output gap coefficient, the parameter estimates remain 
unchanged regardless of whether or not reserve changes are set to zero after 1998Q3. 
Note that the degree of sterilization λ  is almost complete regardless of whether or not 
                                                 
15Actual intervention data are confidential, but were provided to us by the BoC. We are 
not the first to have access to this data. See also Fatum (2005) and Fatum and King 
(2005). The fact that, based on the Bank’s data, there appears to have been no 
intervention in September 2000, when such intervention is known to have taken place, 
points to a multitude of ways a central bank can intervene beyond the usual buying and 
selling of foreign exchange. The Australian intervention data includes the impact from 
the use of derivatives in the implementation of foreign exchange intervention. 
16 Reserve changes are measured using closing balances in the Exchange Fund Account 
(denominated in US dollars) which includes the effects of other foreign exchange   12
the foreign exchange reserves variable is zeroed out after 1998Q3. The null hypothesis 
of full sterilization (i.e.,  1 λ = ) is rejected at conventional significance levels, although 
not at the 1% level when the absence of intervention after 1998Q3 is ignored.  
It should be emphasized that our aim is not to estimate the best model from a 
purely econometric perspective. The reason, as noted previously, is that model 
complexity greatly complicates solving the model under rational expectations. 
However, the appendix (not shown) provides a series of diagnostic tests, including 
structural break tests. Generally, the estimated equations pass most of the diagnostic 
tests with no evidence of structural breaks. The worst performer is the IS curve equation 
which shows some evidence of serial correlation and ARCH effects. Experimentation 
with similar specifications did not improve the results. Note that whereas the diagnostic 
tests are applied equation by equation, the rational expectations solution is based on the 
entire model solved jointly (see the following section). 
3.3 Ex Ante Exchange Market Pressure Indices  
In this section we outline the derivation of EMP indices. We assume that 
economic agents are rational. Under the rational expectations hypothesis, changes in 
government policy may have a significant impact on the expected future path of 
economic variables.  
Expectations about the future path of economic variables appear in (1) and (3) 
of our model. By definition, ex ante EMP for period t is the change in the exchange 
rate that would have occurred in period t if economic agents had anticipated the policy 
authority’s decision to refrain from intervention in that period. In order to calculate our 
counterfactual EMP measure, we therefore need to be able to determine what would 
have happened to inflation and exchange rate expectations in this case. Consequently, 
the first step in deriving model-consistent measures of ex ante EMP is to obtain the 
rational expectations solution for our model.  
Even though our model is a relatively simple one, it is nevertheless too complex 
to allow closed-form rational expectations solutions to be obtained analytically; 
numerical methods must therefore be employed. Details of the numerical methods used 
to compute the rational expectations solutions based on parameter estimates are given 
in Appendix 2.  
The reduced-form rational expectations solutions we obtain for the endogenous 
                                                                                                                                            
operations.    13
variables in our model are functions of the lagged values of all of the domestic and 
foreign variables (except the nominal exchange rate). This means that E 3 tt π +  will 
depend on current and future variables. According to our EMP definitions, EMP is 
measured quarter by quarter which means that the calculation of ex ante EMP for 
period t requires ρ  to be set equal to 0 only in period t; in all other periods ρ  should 
be set equal to the value associated with the policy actually implemented in that period. 
In order to derive counterfactual expectations which take into account this hypothetical, 
one-period deviation from the policy actually implemented, we compute a numerical 
RE solution for our model with ρ   set equal to the sample average value.
17 The 
solutions obtained using the average observed value of ρ  are then used to express the 
expected inflation and exchange rate terms as functions of  t ρ  and variables dated 
period t or earlier. The impact of the counterfactual policy on expectations may then 
be captured by setting  0 t ρ = .
18 Details of these derivations are provided in Appendix 2, 
section A2.3.  
Using the RE solutions reported in Appendix 2, we obtain the following 
expressions for E 3 tt π +  and E 1 tt q + Δ   
  3 1 E 0 0203 1 1568 0 6718 0 0264 0 0267 tt t t t t yi π ππ + − =. +. +. −. +.  
  21 0 0374 0 0374 0 0787 0 0103 tt t t ii ππ
∗ ∗
−− −. −. −. −.                                            (12) 
 
 
  1 1 E 9 6427 2 8082 1 7702 0 1199 0 0213 tt t t t t qy i π π + − Δ= − . − . − . + . − .  
  12 0 1011 0 1011 0 0655 0 1285 tt t t ii ππ
∗ ∗
−− +. −. +. +.                                           (13) 
                                                 
17In reality, ρ  is time-varying. However, the numerical procedure we employ requires 
that ρ  take on a constant value over time. Rather than calculate separate RE solutions 
for each quarter, we have chosen to use an average value for all quarters. 
18In our model, economic agents are assumed to be rational and fully informed. As a 
consequence, the coefficients in RE coefficients that would be obtained under the 
counterfactual assumption  0 t ρ =  can be expected differ from those obtained under the 
policy rule that was actually implemented. A precise representation of the impact of 
such a deviation from the policy rule on expectations requires a closed-form RE 
solution. Because the model we employ is too complex to admit a tractable closed-form 
solution, we approximate the solution by employing the RE coefficients computed 
under the observed policy rule. Given that we are only failing to adjust the coefficients 
for a one-period deviation from the estimated policy rule, this approximation should not 
have any significant impact on the quantitative results obtained.   14
 
Substituting (12) into (1), (13) and (6)–(9) into (3), (5)–(9) into (4), and setting  0 t ρ =  
in (9), yields the following estimated economic structure under the counter-factual 
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  The ex ante EMP formula may then be obtained by solving (14) for 
0
t q Δ . Our 
procedure yields the following model-consistent ex ante EMP formula:  
 
0
11 1 125 1262 30 8090 19 5367 0 1699 tt t t qy i π − −− Δ= − . +. +. − .  
  12 23 16 0444 8 1908 1 1878 1 2136 tt tt mi π π − −− − +. Δ − . − . + .  
  2 2 9335 0 0609 0 0918 24 5389 tt t t mi π ε
∗∗
− −. Δ +. −. + .  
  17 4111 12 8374 0 0618 12 8664 tt t t η δσ χ +. −. − . +.                                               (15) 
 
The ex ante EMP indices that we calculated using (15) are given in Tables 1A and 1B.  
3.4 Ex Post Exchange Market Pressure  
Ex post EMP is the excess demand for a currency that remains after the intervention 
policy has been implemented. When a policy authority intervenes in the exchange 
market, some portion of this excess demand for currency is alleviated by the 
intervention. Consequently, exchange rate changes alone will reflect the total excess 
demand for currency only in the absence of intervention. Whenever this is not the case 
and  0 t ρ = , the magnitude of ex post EMP will have to be imputed from observed 
changes in the exchange rate as well as changes in those variables which, through the 
intervention activities of the policy authority, relieved the excess demand. Under 
intermediate exchange rate systems, ex post EMP, as we have defined it, will generally 
have to be imputed from observed changes in the exchange rate and changes in foreign   15
exchange reserves associated with intervention activities.
19 The computation of ex post 
EMP therefore involves a measurement experiment in which observed changes in 
foreign exchange reserves (and possibly also domestic credit changes) are converted 
into exchange rate equivalent units and then combined with observed exchange rate 
changes to yield a composite summary statistic. In this section we describe the method 
by which model-consistent indices of ex post EMP can be obtained.  
As a first step we substitute (6)–(9) into (3), which eliminates t d Δ , and (5)–(9) 
into (4) to eliminate t m Δ . The structure of the small open economy can then be 
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where  
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The semi-reduced form for the observed change in the exchange rate, which is 
obtained by solving (16) for  t q Δ , is given by  
 
1
43 (1 ) ( )
ym
ty y qH ZZ Z
π
π αγ γ β γ
⎧⎫ − ⎪⎪ ⎡⎤
⎨⎬ ⎢⎥ ⎪⎪ ⎣⎦ ⎩⎭ Δ= − − + −                                      (17) 
where  43 4 (1 )(1 ) ty H π α λρ βγ αγ =− − − + .  
In order to compute our measure of ex post EMP, we use the procedure 
developed by Weymark (1995, 1998). In particular, we conduct a measurement 
experiment in which we set  t ρ  equal to zero in (17) but do not allow this hypothetical 
change in intervention activity to have any impact on expectations. Solving the 
resulting system for t q Δ , we obtain the following expression for ex post EMP  
 
1
43 (1 ) ( )
ym
ty y qH ZZ Z
ω π
ωπ αγ γ β γ
⎧⎫ − ⎪⎪ ⎡⎤
⎨⎬ ⎢⎥ ⎪⎪ ⎣⎦ ⎩⎭ Δ= − − + −                                   (18) 
                                                 
19When the policy authority is known to use domestic credit changes to influence the 
external value of its currency, changes in this variable must also be included in the 
aggregate measure.   16
where  34 y Hω π β γα γ =− + .  
It follows immediately from (17) and (18) that the magnitude of ex post EMP can be 













Δ= Δ + Δ .
−+
                                                               (19) 
 
 
Making the substitution  tt t rq ρ Δ =− Δ   in (19) we obtain the following 













Δ= Δ − Δ .
−+
                                                                   (20) 
Using 4 0 025 α =. ,  09 λ =.,  3 0 0222 β = . , 1 24 y γ = −. , and  1 73 π γ = −. , as reported in 
Appendix 1, our ex post EMP formula becomes  
  1 3771 tt t qq r
ω Δ= Δ − . Δ .                                                                                  (21) 
 
The ex post exchange market pressure estimates that we obtain for Canada using (21) 
are also reported in Tables 1A and 1B and are interpreted in light of economic events 
that took place in Section 5.
20 
4. Exchange Market Pressure in Australia  
Australia, like Canada, can be characterized as a small open economy with a 
well-developed financial sector. Hence, the model that we use to describe the 
Australian economy is very similar to the one for Canada, differing only in the details 
of the Phillips curve and IS equation estimated for each of the two countries. The 
sample also differs from the Canadian case since Australia effectively floated 
beginning in 1983, although the gradual movement to liberalize financial markets 
began a few years earlier. Our sample, therefore, spans the 1983-2004 period. In the 
Australian case, (1) and (2) are replaced, respectively, by (22) and (23)  
  01 12 43 14 E[ ] tt t t t t t t t yq π αα π απ α α π π ε
∗
−+ − =+ + + + − Δ − +                           (22) 
 
                                                 
20 In order to maintain consistency with the measure of  t r Δ  used in estimating the parameters in (20), 
t r Δ  for Canada was computed as the log difference of the quarterly closing balances in the Exchange 
Fund Account (denominated in US dollars).    17
  01 12 2 3 3 [] [ ] tt t t t t t t yy i q β ββπ β π π η
∗
−− − =+ − − − − Δ − +                               (23) 
 
Rankin (1998), Kim and Sheen (2002), and Rogers and Siklos (2003) describe 
the various phase of intervention activity in Australia. Other descriptions can be found 
in Becker and Sinclair (2004), Edison, Cashin and Liang (2003). Broadly speaking, the 
RBA’s intervention policies evolved from regular daily interventions, until the late 
1980s, to larger but more frequent interventions during the 1990s. As a result, there 
have been periods when the RBA eschewed interventions altogether. Rankin (1998) 
provides an explanation of the factors motivating foreign exchange intervention by the 
RBA. Diagnostic tests on the estimated specifications suggest no serious econometric 
problems or evidence of structural breaks with the possible exception of the 
sterilization equation. We estimated several versions of equation of the sterilization 
equation for Australia and the estimates employed appear reasonable. Note that the 
preferred estimate of the IS curve is forward-looking. Coefficient estimates obtained 
for Australia are reported in Appendix 1.  
4.1 Ex Ante Exchange Market Pressure  
In order to compute ex ante exchange market pressure for Australia, we need to 
obtain the expressions for the expectations variables E 1 tt π + , E 4 tt π +  and E 1 tt q + Δ  under 
the counterfactual assumption that 0 t ρ = . Using the methodology described in Section 
3.1 and the RE solutions reported in Appendix 2, we obtain for Australia  
  1 E 1 3539 0 8548 0 3677 0 0009 0 0547 0 0081 tt t t t t t yi i ππ π
∗ ∗
+ =. +. +. −. +. −.               (24) 
 
  4 E 5 6247 0 4600 0 9166 0 0014 0 2070 0 0438 tt t t t t t yi i ππ π
∗ ∗
+ =. +. +. −. +. −.              (25) 
 
  1 E 26 8543 0 8120 2 4812 0 0284 0 0741 0 0637 tt t t t t t qy i i ππ
∗ ∗
+ Δ = . − .+ .+ . − .− .           (26) 
Substituting (25) into (22), (24) into (23), (26) and (6)–(9) into (3), (5)–(9) into 
(4), and setting  0 t ρ =   in (9), yields for Australia under the counterfactual 
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where  
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The ex ante EMP formula may then be obtained by solving (27) for
0
t q Δ . Our procedure 
yields the following model-consistent ex ante EMP formula:  
 
0
11 1 53 2283 7 9949 14 5980 0 0007 tt t t qy i π − −− Δ= −. + . +. − .  
  12 2 8 0989 2 8550 0 0007 tt t mi π − −− −. Δ −. +.  
  2 1 9834 0 3782 0 0204 7 0200 tt t t mi π ε
∗∗
− −. Δ −. −. +.  
  18 3600 0 0126 0 2807 6 9668 tt t t η δσχ +. + . − . − .                                                   (28) 
The ex ante EMP indices that we calculated using (28) are given in Table 2.  
4.2 Ex Post Exchange Market Pressure  
Using the procedure described in Section 3.2 to obtain the semi-reduced form for the 




42 23 (1 ) (1 ) ( )
ym q
ty a y a y a y a qH Z Z Z Z
π
π αγ β μ γ β γ γ β γ
⎧ ⎫ − ⎪ ⎪ ⎡⎤
⎨ ⎬ ⎢⎥ ⎪ ⎪ ⎣⎦ ⎩ ⎭ Δ= − −+ − + +             (29) 
where  
 




01 12 33 14
01 12 13
1




at t t t t t
y
at t t t t
q
at t t t
m
at t t t t t t t
Zy
Zy
Zc m i q
Zm h m h yh h i h m h
π αα π απ α α πε









−− − − −−
=+ + + + +
=+ + + +
=− + + + Δ +
=− + Δ + ++ + Δ − Δ − + − .
 
 
Setting 0 t ρ =  in (29) and using the resulting expression, together with (29) to solve for 
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−− +
Δ= Δ + Δ .
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                                                   (30)   19
Making the substitution  tt t rq ρ Δ= −Δ  in (19) we obtain the following operational, 











α λβ μ γ
αβ γ α γ
−− +
Δ= Δ − Δ .
−+
                                                        (31) 
Using 4 0 028 α =. ,  2 0 0148 β =. ,  3 0 0403 β = . ,  0 0448 μ = −. ,  0 1464 λ = . ,  2 6058 y γ =. , 
and 0 8077 π γ =. , as reported in Appendix 1, our ex post EMP formula becomes  
  10 8235 tt t qq r
ω Δ= Δ −. Δ .                                                                                      (32) 
Comparing (21) with (32) indicates that intervention by the RBA had an impact 
on the AUD/USD exchange rate that was almost ten times the size of the impact of the 
BoC’s intervention on the Canadian dollar/us dollar exchange rate. However, it is 
important to note that our estimates for Australia are based on a relatively broader 
money aggregate than for Canada. Our estimate of the degree of sterilization by the 
RBA is  0 1464 λ =. , whereas our estimate for the BoC is  09 λ = . .
21  
5. Evaluating EMP in Canada and Australia 
  The results reported in Tables 1A, 1B, and 2 clearly indicate that the effects of 
sterilized interventions can persist at the quarterly frequency. Moreover, it is often the 
case that the differences between ex post EMP and actual exchange rate changes are 
very small. This is a reflection of the fact that the magnitude of interventions, in 
absolute terms, is small relative to the volume of foreign exchange transactions that 
take place on a daily basis. In contrast, there are noticeable differences between ex ante 
and ex post EMP. These are discussed in greater detail below. The overall implication 
of our results is that intervention affects expectations about inflation and exchange rates 
and, consequently, exchange rate movements.  
In order to assess the effectiveness of sterilized interventions we compute an 
index that measures the policy induced change in exchange market expectations (PICE). 
The PICE index measures the difference between ex ante and ex post EMP over a 
chosen time period. More formally,  










                                                                                                       (33) 
                                                 
21 For Australia,  t r Δ  was calculated as actual intervention in period t expressed as a 
proportion of the size of the M3 money supply in period t-1. The M3 money supply was 
used to maintain consistency with the monetary aggregate used in estimating Australian 
money demand as given by (4).    20
where, as before, 
w
t q Δ  is ex post EMP and 
0
t q Δ  is ex ante EMP in period t.  
For purposes of interpretation, the PICE index values we obtain from (33) can 
be divided into three distinct ranges. When ex post EMP is smaller than ex ante EMP, 
and both EMP measures are of the same sign so that 
0 1
w
tt qq Δ /Δ < , then 0P I C E1 << . 
Under these circumstances, EMP following intervention is smaller, in absolute terms, 
than EMP conditional on no intervention taking place. This would be interpreted as a 
successful intervention. When ex post and ex ante EMP are of the same sign, but ex 
post EMP exceeds ex ante EMP, then 
0 1
w
tt qq Δ /Δ >  and PICE 0 < . Negative values of 
the PICE index are indicative of periods of unsuccessful intervention because exchange 
market pressure remains relatively higher ex post than ex ante. Lastly, there is also the 
possibility that ex post and ex ante EMP are of opposite signs so that  0
w
t q Δ<  
when
0 0 t q Δ> , and vice versa. In this case it is not entirely clear how one should 
interpret the outcome of the intervention. For example, 
0 0 t q Δ >   indicates that the 
exchange rate would have depreciated in the absence of intervention by the policy 
authority. If, in this case, intervention resulted in 0
w
t q Δ < , then the policy authority’s 
intervention activities prevented the currency from depreciating but, instead, caused a 
currency appreciation. This could be construed as a successful intervention since it 
reversed the course of the exchange rate. 
Figures 1A and 1B plot the PICE indices for Canada and Australia, respectively, 
together with the rate of exchange in the exchange rate. Beginning with the Canadian 
results, we note that the PICE index is always positive and fluctuates around the value 
of 1 most of the time. Nevertheless, the index behaves asymmetrically, with PICE  1 >  
almost two-thirds of the time. Evidently, the BoC often underestimated the impact of its 
intervention activity on expectations, causing frequent overshooting of the zero EMP 
mark. In addition, the PICE is volatile. Hence, not surprisingly, the correlation between 
the index and exchange rate changes is fairly small.
22 
Figure 1A highlights several events that can be used to demonstrate the 
usefulness of the ex ante EMP concept introduced in this article. In the early 1980s, the 
BoC placed greater emphasis on exchange rate developments than on meeting targets 
for monetary growth (Howitt (1986), p. 155). Nevertheless, as Howitt goes on to 
                                                 
22 The simple correlation is 0.15, and is unaffected by the omission of outliers (see n.   21
describe in some detail, while the Bank clearly resisted the ongoing exchange rate 
depreciation at the time, there was no clearly announced target. The behavior of the 
PICE index suggests that ex ante and ex post EMP were in sharp contradiction to each 
other around this time.
23  It is well known that the Canadian dollar came under 
speculative attack numerous times during the first half of the 1980s. The frequent 
overshooting of the zero EMP mark in this period is consistent with Weymark’s (1995) 
analysis of the Bank of Canada’s policy response to the speculative pressures that were 
present at that time.  
During the mid-1980s, the BoC’s policy changed course as the central bank 
came to realize that its policy of accommodating Treasury objectives resulted in 
excessive inflation (Courchene (1981)). As a result, particularly between 1984 and 
1985, the Bank of Canada’s monetary policy became far less expansionary (Howitt 
(1986), p.77). The impact of this change in policy is captured in Figure 1A as a sharp 
drop in the PICE index in 1986. This period in Canada’s recent monetary history has 
been described by Bernanke and Mishkin (1992), among others, as having been 
turbulent.  
The next sharp fluctuations in Canada’s PICE index are associated with several 
notable events. During the years 1987-88, a new Governor, John Crow, was appointed 
to the BoC. Immediately after taking office, Crow publicly announced (at the Hanson 
Lecture) that there would henceforth be a more concerted effort to control inflation in 
Canada (see Crow (2002) and Laidler and Robson (1993)). Shortly thereafter, the BoC 
became involved in the Paris Louvre Accord, the purpose of which was to support the 
value of the US dollar. While the agreement was considered to be largely unsuccessful, 
it caused the foreign exchange market to exhibit considerably turbulence for several 
months (Crow (2002), p.96ff). Finally, there was the stock market crash of October 
1987 which led to a softening in the stance of monetary policy, albeit temporarily. The 
confluence of these events is clearly seen in the behavior of the PICE index during this 
period. A similar reaction shows up in the PICE index later in the sample in the 
                                                                                                                                            
23), or the introduction of inflation targets (correlation is 0.17 after 1991Q1). 
23Figure 1A omits the PICE values for 1985Q4 and 1986Q1 which are, respectively, 
5.09 and 17.99, and 2000Q4 which is 10.31 to allow the remaining estimated to be 
shown clearly in the plot. The omitted PICE values are all instances of interventions 
that successfully reversed the course of the exchange rate. We deal in the following 
section with macroeconomic events surrounding the whole period studied. In the 
preceding two quarters the Canadian dollar ceased to depreciate and began a sharp and   22
aftermath of the bursting of the tech bubble in 1999-2000 that would eventually result 
in historically low minimal interest rates.
24  
Two other events are noteworthy. First, our PICE index reveals that in the 
months leading up to the Quebec referendum of October 1995, large, and successful, 
interventions were undertaken by the BoC.
25 Second, the coordinated intervention in 
support of the euro in September 2000 also shows up clearly in Figure 1A.
26 The 
behavior of the PICE index after July 1998 may also have been influenced by the 
Bank’s explicit abandonment of intervention. The BoC’s relatively brief reliance on a 
monetary conditions index, which linked interest rate and exchange rate changes, as a 
means of communicating its monetary policy stance to the public may also have had 
some impact on the PICE index (see Siklos (2001) and Laidler and Robson (2004)).
27 
There are also two events that are notable because of their failure to have any 
significant impact on the PICE index. Neither the adoption of inflation targets in 1991 
nor the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 generates any discernible movement in the 
PICE index.  
We now turn to the evidence for Australia. The Australian PICE index is plotted 
in Figure 1B. As can be seen from the highlighted range of valued for the index, 
interventions by the RBA have been largely successful. Unlike the BoC, the RBA has 
actively intervened in foreign exchange markets even after the adoption of inflation 
targeting in 1993 (see, for example, Pitchford (1993) and Rogers and Siklos (2003)).  
Perhaps more striking is the relative lack of volatility in PICE movements. As a result, 
there is a significant negative correlation between PICE and exchange rate changes 
(-0.62). Hence, exchange rate depreciations (appreciations) are associated with a fall 
                                                                                                                                            
rapid appreciation against the US dollar. 
24The behavior of the PICE index at this time may also have been affected by the events 
surrounding the appointment of David Dodge as Governor of the Bank of Canada (see 
Laidler and Robson (2004)). 
25The values of the PICE index during 1995 suggest that the referendum did not have as 
large an effect on perceptions of the exchange rate as did the other events described 
here. This seems consistent with the space, of lack thereof, devoted to the overall 
impact of the Quebec referendum in the most widely read narratives of monetary policy 
in Canada (e.g., Crow (2002), Laidler and Robson (2004)). 
26Laidler and Robson (2004, p.125) state that the BoC did intervene in the foreign 
exchange market though actual intervention data supplied to us by the Bank suggests 
that no such intervention took place. 
27The Bank of Canada began using the monetary conditions index the mid 1990s. The 
Bank’s reliance on this measure and its communication to financial markets gradually 
faded away entirely by the end of the sample considered here.   23
(rise) in the PICE. Given that the PICE is, with one exception, always positive, this 
indicates that ex post EMP is always smaller than ex ante EMP, consistent with a 
successful intervention policy.  
The absence of outlier values for the PICE index also indicates that sharp 
divergences between ex ante and ex post EMP are not apparent in the Australian data. 
Nor is there evidence of any asymmetry in the behavior of the PICE index; only slightly 
under one half of the reported values for the index either exceed one or are negative. 
Indeed, the only negative value for the PICE index occurs shortly before the inflation 
targeting policy was announced by the RBA.
28 Note, however, that the introduction of 
these targets followed a period of rapidly falling nominal interest rates.
29 Once interest 
rates ceased falling quickly, in the two quarters preceding the introduction of the new 
policy regime, there was a sharp adjustment in the PICE index. Hence, unlike the 
Canadian experience, the introduction of inflation targeting in Australia temporarily 
undermined the effectiveness of the RBA’s intervention activities causing exchange 
market pressure to be considerably larger than it would have been in the absence of 
intervention. As in the Canadian case, there is nothing out of the ordinary about the 
behavior of the Australian PICE index around the time of the Asian financial crisis. 
This is consistent with the view that monetary policy in Australia was “at peace” during 
this period, a circumstance which Bell (2004, chapter 4; for an opposing view see 
Rankin 1998) attributes to the RBA’s pragmatic approach to inflation targeting which 
avoided displaying, at least in public, undue emphasis on inflation control.  
 
6. Conclusions 
  This paper introduces a new method of evaluating the effectiveness of sterilized 
interventions in foreign exchange markets. Because actual interventions by central 
banks occur at high frequencies it is difficult for standard macro-econometric models, 
which are usually estimated using quarterly data, to capture the impact and significance 
                                                 
28Inflation targets were announced by the RBA in 1993 but were only jointly agreed to 
by the government in 1996 (see Siklos (2002) and Bell (2004)). Moreover, the targets 
were medium range objectives for inflation rather than the short-term inflation target 
ranges introduced in Canada. 
29Bell (2004, chapter 4) argues that the RBA had little credibility, let alone meaningful 
autonomy prior to the 1990s. The Australian dollar began floating in December 1983. 
During the 1984-86 period, the trade-weighted exchange rate fell by approximately one 
third. The impact of this change in exchange rate regime appears to show up primarily 
in interest rate volatility.   24
of intervention activity. We propose the concept of ex ante exchange market pressure as 
a benchmark against which to measure the longer term effectiveness of exchange 
market intervention. Ex ante EMP is our estimate of the change in the exchange rate 
under the counterfactual experiment that the central bank did not intervene and that this 
policy was rationally anticipated by economic agents. The difference between ex ante 
and ex post EMP indicators, expressed in the form of an index, represents the 
proportion of EMP removed through intervention. We refer to the resulting indicator as 
the policy induced change in expectations (PICE). Using this approach we find that the 
effects of sterilized interventions persist even at the quarterly frequency. We also 
conclude that interventions primarily impact expectations since the differential 
between ex post market pressure and actual exchange rate movements dissipates almost 
completely within a quarter. From this we conclude that intervention primarily impacts 
expectations. 
We apply the concept to data from Canada and Australia, two archetypical 
small open economies with notably different foreign exchange market intervention 
practices and histories. Our results highlight how meaningful our index of effectiveness 
of intervention in that we are able to explain notable changes in the PICE index on the 
basis of actual events that would have had a significant impact on exchange rate 
expectations. An obvious next step would be to apply the procedures developed here to 
emerging or other economies where explicit exchange rate management is in place, and 
sterilized interventions is routinely undertaken. This extension is left for future 
research.   25
 
TABLE 1A   
CANADA   
Exchange Market Pressure 1978:4 – 1995:4   
Date  observed   ex ante   ex 
post  
Date  observed  ex ante   ex post  
  Δ t q    Δ
0
t q    Δ
w
t q     Δ t q    Δ
0
t q    Δ
w
t q    
1978:1         1987:1  − 3.67   − 30.74  − 3.67   
  2           2  − 0.25   44.57   − 0.25   
  3           3  − 0.50   39.65   − 0.50   
  4   2.87   107.05   2.87     4  − 1.01   − 15.14  − 1.01   
1979:1   0.85   105.25   0.85   1988:1  33 6 − .    11 76 − .   33 6 − .   
  2   − 2.27   60.10   − 2.27    2  − 2.93   10.36   − 2.93   
  3   0.57   138.65   0.57     3  10 9 − .    30.66   10 9 − .   
  4   0.85   130.84   0.85     4  08 2 − .    25.65   08 2 − .   
1980:1   − 1.14   81.65   − 1.14  1989:1  − 1.39   32.58   − 1.39   
  2   0.57   108.49   0.57     2  0.00   28.96   0.00   
  3   − 1.15   110.17   − 1.15    3  − 0.84   41.69   − 0.84   
  4   2.56   183.819   2.56     4  − 1.42   56.89   − 1.42   
1981:1   0.56   226.06   0.56   1990:1  1.42   53.92   1.42   
  2   0.28   152.36   0.28     2  − 1.42   13.06   − 1.42   
  3   1.11   226.42   1.11     3  − 1.15   − 41.40  − 1.15   
  4   − 1.39   158.03   − 1.39    4  0.58   − 53.14  0.58   
1982:1   1.11   40.25   1.11   1991:1  − 0.29   14.30   − 0.29   
  2   2.99   89.82   2.99     2  − 0.87   9.61   − 0.87   
  3   0.53   41.50   0.53     3  − 0.29   5.77   − 0.29   
  4   − 1.34   − 22.71   − 1.34    4  − 0.58   59.22   − 0.58   
1983:1   − 0.27   14.90   − 0.27  1992:1  3.46   − 115.81  3.46   
  2   0.00   14.67   0.00     2  1.68   − 131.29  1.68   
  3   0.00   − 39.24   0.00     3  0.28   − 131.46  0.28   
  4   0.81   − 36.87   0.81     4  5.14   − 88.15  5.14   
1984:1   1.34   − 21.16   1.34   1993:1  0.00   − 89.94  0.00   
  2   2.62   − 27.84   2.62     2  0.53   − 128.30  0.53   
  3   1.53   − 45.78   1.53     3  2.59   − 63.54  2.59   
  4   0.76   − 47.257   0.76     4  1.77   − 53.48  1.78   
1985:1   2.25   − 41.19   2.25   1994:1  1.00   − 75.46  1.00   
  2   1.47   − 28.05   1.47     2  2.94   − 77.61  2.94   
  3   − 0.73   2.16   − 0.73    3  − 0.73   − 99.71  − 0.73   
  4   1.46   − 0.36   1.46     4  − 0.24   − 113.13  − 0.24   
1986:1   1.68   − 0.10   1.68   1995:1  2.88   − 70.21  2.88   
  2   − 1.19   − 41.44   − 1.19    2  − 2.40   − 15.12  − 2.40  
  3   0.00   − 16.71   0.00     3  − 1.47   − 36.72  − 1.47  
  4   0.00   − 47.88   0.00     4  0.25   − 54.21  0.25   
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 TABLE 1B   
CANADA   
Exchange Market Pressure 1996:1 – 2003:4   
  observed   ex ante   ex 
post  
  observed  ex ante   ex 
post   
Date  Δ t q    Δ
0
t q    Δ
w
t q   Date  Δ t q    Δ
0
t q    Δ
w
t q    
1996:1   1.22   − 74.62   1.22   2000:1  − 1.37   3.81   − 1.37  
  2   − 0.49   − 103.43  − 0.49    2  2.04   38.51   2.04   
  3   0.24   − 53.36   0.24     3  0.00   35.36   0.00   
  4   − 1.47   − 58.07   − 1.47    4  2.66   − 0.28   2.66   
1997:1   0.74   − 23.34   0.74   2001:1  0.22   17 12 − .    0.22   
  2   1.70   − 39.09   1.70     2  0.87   3.55   0.87   
  3   0.24   − 50.44   0.24     3  0.43   − 41.52   0.43   
  4   1.67   − 66.10   1.67     4  2.13   − 100.72   2.13   
1998:1   1.41   − 72.96   1.41   2002:1  1.05   − 35.44   1.05   
  2   1.39   − 99.68   1.39     2  − 2.75   − 64.08   − 2.75  
  3   4.50   − 98.44   4.50     3  0.85   − 56.98   0.85   
  4   1.74   − 94.41   1.74     4  0.00   − 0.76   0.00   
1999:1   − 1.96   − 99.63   − 1.96  2003:1  − 3.68   15.34   − 3.68  
  2   − 2.68   − 58.25   − 2.68    2  − 7.80   − 56.86   − 7.80  
  3   0.90   − 35.06   0.90     3  − 1.20   − 75.43   − 1.20  
  4   − 0.90   − 32.52   − 0.90    4  − 4.95   − 44.47   − 4.95  
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TABLE 2   
AUSTRALIA   
Exchange Market Pressure 1985:1 – 2003:3   
Date  observed   ex ante   ex post  Date  observed  ex ante  ex post   
  Δ t q    Δ
0
t q    Δ
w
t q      Δ t q    Δ
0
t q   Δ
w
t q    
1985:1   22.19   65.49   22.11   1995:1  − 5.81   51.03   − 5.83   
  2   30.93   115.60   30.99     2  − 0.48   59.49   − 0.48   
  3   18.32   130.43   18.32     3  0.00   74.22   0.01   
  4   20.78   118.47   20.80     4  1.00   72.61   1.00   
1986:1   6.03   123.82   6.02   1996:1  10 0 − .    72.56   09 9 −.    
  2   − 6.65   82.69   − 6.67    2  − 8.61   56.63   − 8.65   
  3   11.42   85.02   11.42     3  63 6 − .    55.76   63 3 −.    
  4   6.00   100.57   5.98     4  61 7 − .    49.28   61 8 −.    
1987:1   4.80   100.40   4.72   1997:1  − 3.07   42.57   − 3.07   
  2   − 0.48   103.88   − 0.51    2  3.12   53.95   3.12   
  3   − 13.76   109.41   − 13.80    3  6.85   37.90   6.84   
  4   − 8.31   115.64   − 8.25    4  14.08   49.32   14.07   
1988:1   − 7.17   107.77   − 7.20  1998:1  15.82   58.10   15.84   
  2   − 8.44   110.75   − 8.47    2  20.14   68.14   20.13   
  3   − 11.33   108.50   − 11.33    3  20.53   87.05   20.54   
  4   − 17.62   125.42   − 17.60    4  10.49   101.04  10.48   
1989:1   − 16.10   124.14   − 16.12  1999:1  4.97   89.73   4.98   
  2   − 0.26   144.96   − 0.27    2  − 3.85   86.87   − 3.85   
  3   4.69   160.93   4.69     3  − 8.32   81.88   − 8.34   
  4   7.01   141.90   7.00     4  − 3.59   86.96   − 3.59   
1990:1   9.91   154.67   9.93   2000:1  0.21   86.14   0.22   
  2   1.29   142.22   1.27     2  10.14   95.76   10.14   
  3   − 5.76   101.42   − 5.78    3  12.62   97.64   12.60   
  4   0.00   101.44   0.00     4  19.30   77.01   19.30   
1991:1   − 1.54   81.64   − 1.54  2001:1  17.35   70.67   17.34   
  2   − 0.26   45.04   − 0.26    2  14.11   74.34   14.11   
  3   3.44   35.24   3.44     3  11.20   57.56   11.20   
  4   − 0.52   13.62   − 0.52    4  3.83   60.72   3.83   
1992:1   3.31   12.20   3.33   2002:1  2.62   65.30   2.62   
  2   1.53   2.89   1.52     2  − 7.08   66.99   − 7.09   
  3   6.55   4.30   6.60     3  − 6.72   68.94   − 6.71   
  4   11.84   14.68   11.84     4  − 8.55   53.18   − 8.54   
1993:1   8.87   32.73   8.87   2003:1  − 13.65  56.42   − 13.65   
  2   8.72   32.89   8.71     2  − 14.80  41.79   − 14.82  
  3   8.86   16.39   8.86     3  − 18.20  41.79   − 14.82  
  4   4.32   34.89   8.86          
1994:1   − 2.56   44.12   − 2.56         
  2   − 4.02   48.34   − 4.02         
  3   − 9.84   57.34   − 9.84         
  4   − 12.31   46.94   − 12.31         
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Note: See text for details of the construction of the index. The exchange rate is the first 
log difference of the CAD/USD nominal exchange rate. [1] = BoC switches to an 
exchange rate objective; [2] = Hanson lecture by John Crow, BoC Governor, Louvre 
Accord, and October 1987 crash; [3] = inflation targeting introduced; [4] = ECB 
coordinated intervention. PICE estimates for 198Q4, 1986Q1, and 2000Q4 are omitted 
because these would distort the figure. See n.23 for the estimates for these dates.  29













































































Note: See text for details of the construction of the index. The exchange rate is the first 
log difference of the AUD/USD nominal exchange rate. [1] = Adoption of inflation 
targets. The shaded areas are the various phases of intervention activity documented by 
Rankin (1998). The shaded areas to the left and right were periods of intensive 
intervention. The middle area represents a period of zero intervention.   30
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